Wills – No-Contest Clause Validity

A no-contest clause in a Will attempts to limit a beneficiary’s ability to challenge the Will.  An example of such a provision would be:

To X but if X directly or indirectly attempts to contest or oppose the validity of this Will, then X shall forfeit his or her right to the legacy, bequest or gift.

How have the BC courts treated no-contest clauses?

There have been two BC cases that have dealt with no-contest clauses.  In both of the cases, the no-contest clause was deemed invalid.  In one case the no-contest clause was deemed invalid as it breached the in terrorem doctrine by not including a gift-over provision in the no-contest clause and the other was deemed invalid on the basis of public policy as the no-contest clause attempted to circumvent the provisions of legislation formerly known as the Wills Variation Act (“WVA”).

In Bellinger v. Nuytten Estate, 2003 BCSC 563, a no-contest clause was the subject of judicial scrutiny.  The court deemed the no-contest clause void.  The court based its decisions on a breach of the in terrorem doctrine.  This doctrine is creature of equity and stands for the proposition that the will-maker had not really meant to impose the no-contest clause, and that therefore the condition could only be valid if the will-maker demonstrated, by the inclusion of an explicit gift-over clause, that the will-maker intended as the Will suggests.  So in other words, for a no-contest clause to be valid it must include an explicit gift over clause.  A gift over clause using the example above would look like this:

To X but if X directly or indirectly attempts to contest or oppose the validity of this Will, than X shall forfeit his or her right to the legacy, bequest or gift.  If X forfeits his or her right to the legacy, bequest or gift, then the forfeited gift will fall into the residue of my estate.

In Kent v Mckay, [1982] B.C.J. No. 67 the court determined that the no-contest clause was void not because of the lack of a gift over clause but on the basis of public policy.

The court observed that the no-contest clause in Kent purported to forbid “any litigation in connection with any of the provisions of this my Will.” It therefore encompassed even applications under the WVA.

The court in Kent further stated that it is a matter of public policy that support and maintenance be provided for those defined individuals under the WVA and it would be contrary to public policy to allow a testator to circumvent the provisions of the WVA by the creation of such a no-contest clause as was present in Kent. It is important to the public as a whole that widows, widowers and children be at liberty to apply for adequate maintenance and support in the event that sufficient provision for them is not made in the will of their spouse or parent.